“In the political system of today, inequalities in political resources remain, but they tend to be noncumulative. The political system of New Haven, then, is one of dispersed inequalities.”
“[C]ommon interpretations that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as a competition among interest groups are seriously in error for their failure to take account of the distinctive privileged position of businessmen in politics.”
These two quotes stem from the two perspectives looking at the distribution of power in modern democratic states that I chose to compare – pluralism and neopluralism. Why I did not pick elitism is a decision that will require some justification early on. After that, I will outline the two perspectives in some detail and contrast them like required. What will help this comparison is the fact that both quotes actually stem from the same scholar – Robert Dahl (Dahl 1961, 85; Dahl and Lindblom 1976, xxxvi). His change of mind will guide this comparison. Because of his and Charles E. Lindblom’s influential weight in this debate, and surely in this essay, I will work with their definition of power as power over somebody. “A” possesses power over “B” if “A” can make “B” do what “A” wants.
Elitism
The idea of a ruling elite, as being a cohesive group of people, seems incredibly unlikely and it can be shown relatively conclusively that there is no such conspiratorial group (Dahl 1961; Hewitt 1974). Some, however, use Bachrach and Batray (1962) to suggest that these elites influence not so much the decision-making process, but make sure the agenda does not even include issues that contest their rule. Issues on the agenda, then, are only secondary and irrelevant to the elite. This produces a theory of a cohesive, but invisible elite that filters issues secretly. Such a theory is unfalsifiable and therefore irrelevant, I will not include its discussion. The more fruitful ideas of structural elitism are, to some extent, included in neopluralism that will be discussed at some length later.
Pluralism
A much more promising theory, I find, is pluralism. In the words of Sarah Perrigo, “it is the liberal version of how power is distributed” (2009). It assumes that power comes in different kinds or dimensions, such as economic power, military power, political power, etcetera and that these kinds are not directly comparable – who has more power over me, my mother or my employer? It would be extremely unlikely that a cohesive, powerful elite could expand over all these dimensions, given that power cannot be converted from one kind into the other easily. ‘[T]he power structure is [therefore] fluid and complex, not unitary and monolithic’ (Bilton 2002, 199). According to pluralists, this is not only how it actually is in reality, but also how it should. If influence of a person, group or institution had visible boundaries, a pluralist society would look like this, with no person, group or institution possessing absolute control.
Dahl has been one of the most influential writers from this perspective. Together with Lindblom, he has coined the word ‘polyarchy’, or ‘the rule of the many’, to characterise modern democracies. A state that qualifies for the term has a government in the hands of elected officials, free and fair elections, universal suffrage, a right to run for office that is unrestricted, freedom of expression, free access to information and some independence from government for associations (Dahl 1989, as cited in, Heywood 2007).
Neopluralism
In their influential book Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Dahl and Lindblom accepted some of the Marxist and structural elitist critique and admitted errors in their discussion of pluralism.
“In our discussion of pluralism we made another error – and it is a continuing error in social science – in regarding businessmen and business groups as playing the same interest-group role as other groups in polyarchal systems, though more powerfully. Businessmen play a distinctive role in polyarchal politics that is qualitatively different from that of any other interest group. It is also much more powerful than an interest-group role.”
Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom (1976, as cited in Vogel 1987; my ephasis)
For them, the pluralist model is still partly right. ‘[P]olyarchy exists, but it is a deformed polyarchy’ (Dahl 1989, as cited in Bilton 2002, 201). Their main concern was, and still is, that the growth of the corporate sector and the concentration of power within it undermine democracy. So the image above, in their view, changed to this, the triangle being big business in the hands of the view.
They make very clear that they do not mean a cohesive group of the same people. Rather, they think this phenomena is a consequence of the structure in a market system. It requires very little agency to keep this status quo. ‘Simply minding one’s own business is the formula for an extraordinary system for repressing change’ (Lindblom 1982, 326). While Dahls seems to have addressed more the undemocratic nature of corporations, Lindblom has concentrated on the supposedly disproportionate influence that business enjoys in America. It is these two main disputes where pluralism and neopluralism contrast starkest that I shall turn to next.
Contrasting pluralism and neopluralism
I am first going to address the point Dahl raises in On removing … (1977) that corporations are non-democratic in nature. Secondly, I will discuss Lindblom’s point in Politics and Markets (1977) that business enjoys a privileged power position in modern society. I am going to make heavy use of David Vogel’s witty counter argument in his ‘dissent from new conventional wisdom’ (1987, 385).
Dahl’s main point seems to be that, regarding the workplace, he is uncomfortable with the fact that people live most of their lives ‘not within a democratic system but instead within a hierarchical structure of subordination’ (Dahl 1977, as cited in, Vogel 1987, 388). Therefore, he wishes to democratise privately owned and controlled economic enterprise, so that employees have a say and are not strictly governed. However, I agree with Vogel, the choice of criticising just business is arbitrary. ‘Universities, foundations, labour unions [and many more institutions] exercise political power, and none is governed according to democratic principles or precepts’ (Vogel 1987, 389). In Dahl’s definition of a democratic system, not even the government itself is democratic for its employees are subordinates, just like in a firm. What is special about the institutions in a democracy then? I would say a person’s right to leave all institutions in which she or he cannot vote.
In Politics and Markets (1977), Lindblom raises a point more relevant to this essay. He argues that business has a privileged position of power, because it has the monopoly on providing public welfare. In his view, the power relation between government and business is hugely asymmetrical. ‘Compared to [international] market, even the largest state is small-scale’ (Lindblom 1995, 684). Consequently, while the government has to induce business to perform its basic social functions, business can ask for anything by threat of partial withdrawal from the local or national market and, thus, unemployment. This threat needs not be articulated, it is a structural consequence of the market system. To illustrate this unequal power relationship.
The punishment for failure to give in to these structural pressures happens automatically, it is a ‘automatic punishment recoil’. Whatever business dislikes is a disincentive and curbs unemployment. Thus, the market system is a prison. And not only a prison of action, but also of thought.
“We have come to think not of human need and aspiration but of the market system as the fixed element in the light of which we think about policy. We find it difficult to think for the market as the variable.” Charles E. Lindblom (1982, 333)
Being totally aware that Lindblom’s analysis is addressing a structural condition, I still disagree with the abstraction of businesses into business. There is simply no cohesive ‘business’ in my view. Rather to the contrary, the market system fosters active competition between businesses. Also, the market does not need the state to give any incentives, as it even runs with active disincentives (cigarette industry). Looking at figure 3 above with ‘Marlboro’ in mind renders the argument rather surreal. What might look like control of the government by ‘business’ may simply be the temporary convergence of interests. In the end, nobody is interested in a recession. There are, however, cases where business might want economic growth and the government security or health. I see the fact that rich countries invest around 10% of their GDP in health care as an argument against Lindblom. While it is true and healthy to realise that the state cannot command the economy, and is therefore also not liable for its downturn, ‘business’ is in no position to threaten the government either. The Reagan administration, Vogel notes, ‘has also presided over what is estimated to be a permanent loss of two million industrial jobs due to imports – and yet for the most part resisted pleas from both businessmen and workers to increase American tariffs’ (Vogel 1987, 295). A tendency could be that government has a heightened interest in economic growth during recessions and a lower one during a boom. This would imply that ‘business’ has little say in either situation, because during a recession they are in need of money and during a boom government has other interests. All in all, I find my point best summed up by, again, Vogel (ibid., 393): ‘In the real world, neither business nor government get all they want from each other’.
Conclusion
After I explained why I did not chose elitism, I have shown the pluralist and the neopluralist account for how power is distributed in a modern democracy. While contrasting the two, I have taken side with the pluralist account of reality. Writing this essay has therefore been uplifting, for I had a more elitist view of the economy before. Whatever the case empirically, our normative goal, I find, should be pluralism.
Bibliography
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Bilton, T. (2002) Introductory sociology, 4th ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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Perrigo, S. (2009) Power and the state: perspectives on the distribution of power in liberal democracies [Lecture], Bradford. Available on Blackboard.
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