‘Freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its principle means.’ – Amartya Sen (1999, p. 10)
Amartya Sen’s quote which I am to discuss in this paper stems from his work Development as Freedom, which has been described by The Economist as ‘a personal manifesto [and] a summing up’ (Anonymous 1999). A summing up of what?
Ein Artikel in der NZZ hat mich angeregt, diesen Eintrag zu schreiben. Da wurde einer Basketballspielerin in Luzern verboten, mit Kopftuch Basketballmatches zu spielen.
Wir leben in einer Weltwirtschaft, was niemanden mehr überrascht. Wir fühlen aber weiterhin lokal, weil wir halt eben Menschen sind. So wird über einen Todesfall in der Nachbarschaft vielleicht monatelang geredet, über eine Schlammlawine mit mehreren Toten vielleicht zwei drei Wochen und über den Bürgerkrieg in Darfur im Sudan mit mehreren Toten gar nicht. Das Problem, das ich in diesem Essay aufzeigen möchte, ist, dass die Weltwirtschaft und die Technologie unser Handeln jeder Zeit mit der grossen Welt verbinden, wir den Konsequenzen unserer Taten aber unmöglich nachfühlen können.
“If we had put one more ounce of lead on South Mogadishu on the night of 3 and 4 October, I believe it would have sunk.”
- Major-General William Gerrison, 1994, talking about Battle of Mogadishu on the 3 and 4 October 1993
(as cited in Mayall 1996, 17)
Looking at “Black Hawk Down” from an International Relations perspective raises important issues. How is intra-state military intervention by the UN justified? Is there such a thing as selfless humanitarian intervention? What factors led to the regrettable outcome of the intervention of Somalia? What can be learned for the future? Question like these require answers that I hope to deliver in this essay. I will first discuss the theoretical justification and basis of UN intra-state intervention. Then, I will go on and assess both Somalia missions the US was involved in, UNITAF and UNOSOM II. The failure of the intervention in Somalia resulted in the Somali Syndrome which I will cover last.
“The strongest man is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his power into right, and obedience into duty.” – Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762, 103)
To rule indefinitely, Rousseau suggests three tools: strength, right and duty. These translate smoothly into direct, structural and cultural violence – the topic of this essay. I will first give a definition of violence in general and then explain these sub-terms. This essay will explore the value of these three concepts defining or understanding violence, but eventually stress its value for guiding research.
“In the political system of today, inequalities in political resources remain, but they tend to be noncumulative. The political system of New Haven, then, is one of dispersed inequalities.”
“[C]ommon interpretations that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as a competition among interest groups are seriously in error for their failure to take account of the distinctive privileged position of businessmen in politics.”
These two quotes stem from the two perspectives looking at the distribution of power in modern democratic states that I chose to compare – pluralism and neopluralism. Why I did not pick elitism is a decision that will require some justification early on. After that, I will outline the two perspectives in some detail and contrast them like required. What will help this comparison is the fact that both quotes actually stem from the same scholar – Robert Dahl (Dahl 1961, 85; Dahl and Lindblom 1976, xxxvi). His change of mind will guide this comparison. Because of his and Charles E. Lindblom’s influential weight in this debate, and surely in this essay, I will work with their definition of power as power over somebody. “A” possesses power over “B” if “A” can make “B” do what “A” wants.
Tackling this question has been incredibly hard because foreign policy (FP) is torn between International Relations (IR) and a genuine foreign policy analysis. It is a level of analysis problem (Singer 1961) – do we deduce from national structures or from the international system? FP is caught in between domestic and foreign politics. Here, I will choose the bottom-up approach and extrapolate from national conditions, even though this approach has allegedly ‘come to realise its limitations’ (Krieger 1993, 313) and ‘has generally produced little cumulation of knowledge or lasting impact’ (Gideon 1998, 154). I wish to be accurate about FP in this essay (micro-level) and IR theories (macro-level), almost by definition, neglect detail.
According to Webber and Smith (2002) and Brown (2001), I interpret make as formulate, not implement. So “A” might formulate a FP like ‘stronger economic ties to “B”’, but how “A” will actually implement this is another story.
I will consider FP as ‘the strategy of action developed by a state [or non-state actor] with respect to other states or international actors, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of the “national interest”’ (Gregory 2009). The national interest is the ‘territorial integrity of a nation, the preservation of its values and way of life, and the promotion of a nation’s welfare’ (Gregory 2009). Let us then turn to the environment a democratic leadership would find itself in, trying to set up its FP. Read the rest of this entry »
This article may be a little heretic around a Peace Department at a University that is considered Nr 1 for Peace Studies worldwide, but in the name of free thought and fostering debate, let’s write (and read!) it anyway. I have talked to many people in Peace Studies that feel the same way I do and can therefore assure you, I am not the only deserter. So, what is my concern?